Fordham University
Masthead Logo

DigitalResearch@Fordham

Articles and Chapters in Academic Book
Collections

Philosophy

Spring 2010

Ex aliquo nihil: Nietzsche on Science and Modern
Nihilism. ACPQ, 84-2 (Spring 2010): 231-256.
Babette Babich
Fordham University, babich@fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_babich
Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Epistemology Commons, Ethics and Political
Philosophy Commons, German Language and Literature Commons, and the History of Philosophy
Commons
Recommended Citation
Babich, Babette, "Ex aliquo nihil: Nietzsche on Science and Modern Nihilism. ACPQ, 84-2 (Spring 2010): 231-256." (2010). Articles
and Chapters in Academic Book Collections. 27.
https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_babich/27

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at DigitalResearch@Fordham. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles
and Chapters in Academic Book Collections by an authorized administrator of DigitalResearch@Fordham. For more information, please contact
considine@fordham.edu.

Ex aliquo nihil: Nietzsche on Science, Anarchy, and
Democratic Nihilism
Babette Babich

Abstract. This essay explores the nihilistic coincidence of the ascetic ideal and
Nietzsche’s localization of science in the conceptual world of anarchic socialism
as Nietzsche indicts the uncritical convictions of modern science by way of a critique of the causa sui, questioning both religion and the enlightenment as well as
both free and unfree will and condemning the “poor philology” enshrined in the
language of the “laws” of nature. Reviewing the history of philosophical nihilism
in the context of Nietzsche’s “tragic knowledge” along with political readings of
nihilism, willing nothing rather than not willing at all, today’s this-worldly and
very planetary nihilism includes the virtual loci of technological desire (literally
willing nothing) as well as the perpetual and consequently pointless threat of
nuclear annihilation and the routine or ordinary annihilation of plant and animal
life as of inorganic nature.

The destinal nihil unfolds, triumphs with technology, and
in this triumph reveals itself.
—Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting:
From Principles to Anarchy

W

hat Nietzsche calls political and philosophical or epistemological
nihilism includes his critique of nineteenth century socialism
and democracy as it also includes his critique of modern science.
The last is perhaps most problematic just because most readings of Nietzsche
and democracy, Nietzsche and politics in general, certainly most readings of
Nietzsche and nihilism happily fail to raise the question of science. Yet—and here
Nietzsche is as he is in most things a true or critical student of Kant—Nietzsche
challenges that if one fails to raise the question of science, a question he claims
he is one of the first to raise, one follows blindly in its wake.
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Quite apart from certain exceptions, certainly not influential in
themselves,1 science today is not merely unchallenged but increasingly installed
into the place of philosophy—a philosophy long beset with what Richard
Rorty, echoing a point long made by the social scientists for their own part,
calls “physics-envy.”2 Rorty was apparently fond of the phrase and he repeats
it in several essays in his concern with the political dynamics of the academy,
in this case regarding the conclusive (and you know something is conclusive,
that is to say, a done deal, when its existence is repeatedly and spontaneously
denied) hegemony of analytic philosophy.3 If “physics-envy” also affects political science in the rage towards quantificational analysis, i.e., mathematics
of whatever kind, wherever possible, in analytic philosophy, “physics,” or just
plain science “envy” is the longing, as much as possible to be, or at the very
least to be like, the sciences. This wishful-thinking is now so well-advanced
that some philosophers fail to see (or more accurately said: aspire to fail to see)
where a specific science (cognitive, brain, or linguistic or social, etc.) leaves off
and their own “philosophical” reflections begin.4 Just a tad more radical than
Rorty, Heidegger named this “the end of philosophy,” i.e., the dissolution of
philosophy in science.
Thus philosophy and even theology can be, so contemporary accounts
maintain, reduced to science and to the terms of science, or vice-versa.5 And in
this way, the language of “intelligent design” betrays the same cultural pro-science
disposition. Hence it is significant that religious fundamentalists do not challenge
science or the teaching of scientific evolution but argue for equal time for the
teaching not of the bible but of scientific creationism. Science and religion are
1
Critical readings of science are rare in the academic culture of philosophy but one can
note, among others, authors like Adorno and like Heidegger, themselves rather at odds with one
another.
2
Rorty, “A Tale of Two Disciplines,” Callaloo 17–2 (1994): 575–85, at 576. The term has
been in use for more than forty years, but see Philip Mirowski’s Economics as Social Physics: Physics
as Nature’s Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), particularly chap. 7, “The
Ironies of Physics Envy.”
3
See on this Rorty’s “Analytic and Conversational Philosophy” in A House Divided, ed.
Carlos Prado (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2003), 17–31.
4
See for an example Paul Churchland’s recent book, Neurophilosophy At Work (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007); but see also M. R. Bennett’s and P. M. S. Hacker’s more nuanced Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 2003).
5
Thus we may recall Stephen Hawking’s concluding words in his A Brief History of Time,
invoking what he called the “wonderful” prospect that seems to lie before a science poised to
know “the mind of God.” Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam Books, 1990),
193. Cf. Anthony Flew, “Stephen Hawking and the Mind of God,” Philosophical Essays, ed.
John Shosky (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 175–82. And see too Patrick A.
Heelan, “The Role of Consciousness as Meaning Maker in Science, Culture, and Religion,” Zygon
(2009): 467–86.

Nietzsche on Science, Anarchy, and Democratic Nihilism

233

so compatible that one has designed a prize to commemorate this. This complex
compatibility was one of Nietzsche’s enduring insights.6
“Science,” Heidegger argues “is the new religion.”7 Indeed; and like religion, so Nietzsche reminds us in the third section of On the Genealogy of Morals,
science brooks no critique. Thus any criticism of science tends to mark one, as
Heidegger and Nietzsche have been marked, as anti-science.8
In place of the modern constellation that sets philosophy at best as a
handmaiden of science, Nietzsche undertakes to raise the question of science
as a philosophical question and proposes to illuminate that question using the
resources of art as a self-conscious and innocent illusion. But, and this is the
critical juncture, Nietzsche also emphasizes, both for methodological and logical reasons, that “the problem of science cannot be recognized in the context of
science.”9 Art can help here to the extent that, like science, art is a defense against
truth, an antidote to the deadly insights of tragic knowledge.
For Nietzsche, science and art can be equated, and he differentiates them
only in terms of reflective awareness or honesty.10 As distinguished from the illusions of both science and religion, art is “illusion” with a good “conscience.”
In addition, art lacks the prevailing hostility to life characterizing both religion
and science “for all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view,
and the necessity of perspectives and error.”11 For Nietzsche “life requires illusions, i.e., untruths maintained as truths.”12
As Nietzsche reminds us, “truth” is not always or inevitably an advantage
for life and some truths, as he tells us in his essay on “Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense,” are dangerous and hostile to life, and elsewhere he reminds us
that some truths are bitter or hateful or repellent, etc.13 It is, he declares, “not
possible to live with the truth.”14 Thus we have need of art, and that also means
I point to the parallel between science and religion for Nietzsche in “Nietzsche’s ‘Gay
Science,’” in A Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2006),
97–114. See too Rex Welson, The Philosophy of Nietzsche (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queens
University Press, 2004), 32ff.; and Paul Valadier, “Science as the New Religion,” in Nietzsche,
Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science: Nietzsche and the Sciences II, ed. Babich (in collaboration
with Robert S. Cohen) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), 241–52, among others.
7
Martin Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars: Protocols—Conversations—Letters, (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 2001), 20.
8
See for a discussion, Babich, “‘The Problem of Science’ in Nietzsche and Heidegger,” Revista
Portuguesa de la Filosofia 63 (2007): 205–37.
9
BT §ii.
10
Babich, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 200ff.
11
BT §v.
12
KSA 7, 19 [43], 433.
13
GM I: 1.
14
KSA 13, 16 [40] §7, 500.
6
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that we have need of science qua art, in order that we are not done to “ground”
by the truth.15 It is in this sense that Nietzsche can regard science as a kind of
“self-defense,” in Nietzsche’s words, “against the truth,”16 a perspective consistent
with Nietzsche’s definition of science in On the Genealogy of Morals, as the “latest
and greatest form”17 of the ascetic ideal.
Here I shall be exploring the nihilistic coincidence of this ascetic ideal and
Nietzsche’s localization of science in the conceptual world of anarchic socialism with his reference to August Blanqui’s “Ni dieu, ni maitre,” 18 as Nietzsche
indicts the uncritical convictions of modern science. Using a complex, multiply
tuned argument, stylized in the extreme fashion that continues to elude most of
his readers (but perhaps this keeps us on our toes), Nietzsche does this by way
of a critique of the causa sui, questioning both religion and the enlightenment
as well as both free and unfree will, instituting a philological challenge to the
physicist’s lack of hermeneutics, condemning what now appears to be a case of
“bad ‘philology’” as exemplified in the language of the “laws” of nature.
For Nietzsche, in what would have been an expression of theoretical
under-determinism were he not undermining the theoretical basis of physics,
a scientist might yet emerge who could argue “the ‘necessary’ and ‘calculable’
course” of nature yet “not because laws rule the world but because there is a
total absence of laws.”
How are we to read Nietzsche’s further reflections on science and nihilism
in The Genealogy of Morals, naming science the latest and best instauration of
the ascetic ideal (decried by Nietzsche as inherently nihilist) and declaring that
one would rather will nothing than not will at all?
The considerable range of studies that have been made of the Genealogy of
Morals are inclined to refuse or simply to skip over Nietzsche’s claims with respect
to the nihilism of modern science. In this way, Charles Taylor in his recent book,
A Secular Age, merely echoes most scholarship’s condemnation of Nietzsche’s equation of science and religion, suggesting that a resurgence of faith might counter
Ibid., §6, 498.
BT §i.
17
GM III: 23.
18
BGE §22. The phrase Nietzsche quotes in this context, “ni dieu, ni maitre” was the title of
a journal founded by the anarchist socialist Louis-Auguste Blanqui in 1880. For a comprehensive
overview of the anarchist tradition, see Bernard Thomas, Ni dieu, ni maître, les anarchists (Paris:
Sand & Tchou, 2008); as well as Daniel Guérin, Ni Dieu ni Maître. Anthologie de l’anarchisme
(Paris: La Découverte, 2002). Blanqui was also the author of a cosmological text on the eternal
return and in particular regarding possible worlds, L’éternité par les asters, hypothèse astronomique
(Paris: Librairie Germer Baillière, 1872), which Nietzsche may have read. On Nietzsche and
Blanqui, see Tiziana Andina, “Eterno Ritorno: Nietzsche, Blanqui e la cosmologia del Big Bang,”
Rivista di Estetica 41 (2001): 3–36.
15
16
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nihilism.19 Furthermore, many scholars take Nietzsche’s claim that one would
rather will nothing than not will at all as a reflection on the will as such.20
But what is it to will nothing? If an all-too postmodern answer can be
found in the virtual spaces localizing technological desire,21 do we know what
would it mean not to will at all?

I.
Nietzsche’s Nihilism: Provocation and Equivocation. Is Nietzsche, in Karl
Löwith’s widely influential expression, the “prophet” of nihilism?22 Echoing the
terms of a tradition of political scholarship on the nature (and names) of nihilism,
Löwith goes on to reflect that “Nietzsche not only called ‘European nihilism’
by name for the first time but also helped it come into being.”23 It is the issue
of this facilitation, aiding and abetting nihilism, that continues to set the terms
of political debate on Nietzsche to this day.24 Löwith, influenced as he was by
Heidegger’s style of philosophizing, does not make a single claim but argues that
Nietzsche both sought to engage and to overcome nihilism, embodying both the
radicalization/intensification of nihilism as well as the reversal of nihilism in
the affirmative consummation of the eternal recurrence of the same.25 A corollary to the view that holds Nietzsche’s thinking responsible for contemporary
nihilism presents nihilism as an already accomplished deed and thus as already
passé. Thus Henri Lefebvre argues that if “Nietzsche’s theories are to be taken
seriously, we are already in the midst of nihilism, and already we can see the way
out, the rebirth, the beyond.”26
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
See Tracy B. Strong’s distinction, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration
(Campaigne: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 16–17 and 250–1.
21
I discuss this with reference to both Baudrillard and Lyotard in Babich, “Thus Spoke
Zarathustra or Nietzsche and Hermeneutics in Gadamer, Lyotard, and Vattimo,” Consequences
of Hermeneutics, ed. Jeff Malpas and Santiago Zabala (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
2010), 218–43.
22
Karl Löwith, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, trans. J. Harvey
Lomax (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977 [1935]), 35. See further Jacques Taminiaux,
“The Presence of Nietzsche in Sein und Zeit,” Taminiaux, Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental
Ontology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 175–99.
23
Löwith, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, 7.
24
Several recent collections engage this theme. See, for example and from the point of view
of political theory, Tracy B. Strong’s introduction to his edited collection, Friedrich Nietzsche
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009).
25
See too Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought,
trans. David Green (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964 [1939]).
26
Henri Lefebvre, Introduction to Modernity: Twelve Preludes September 1959–May 1961,
trans. John Moore (London: Verso, 1995), 223.
19
20
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As a thinker and opponent of nihilism, Nietzsche himself does not articulate the sophisticated kind of deja-fait rebirth Lefebvre emphasizes for his
own part. In fact, still today we are hard pressed to understand let alone answer
Zarathustra’s reprise of the Gay Science’s madman’s warning accusation that we
ourselves have killed God and cannot bear the consequences.27 More than a history of the fortunes of belief or anthropomorphic theism, the nihilism Nietzsche
engages is of an all-too-philosophical, all-too-epistemological kind, the sort that
no matter where you turn is hard to shake. As if the sun itself had gone out, so
our madman muses, “Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Isn’t
empty space breathing at us? Hasn’t it gotten colder? Isn’t night and more night
coming again and again?”28
Historically, one of the oldest discussions to link Nietzsche and nihilism is
also one of the most patent or obvious: the entry in Rudolf Eisler’s conceptual
dictionary of philosophy first published in 1901.29 Few scholars cite Eisler on
nihilism, but it has obviously played a role in the literature, as can be seen in Karl
Jaspers in 1919,30 but also in many others including Heidegger and Löwith.
Heidegger’s lecture course on Nietzsche and nihilism begins historically,
with the same Turgenev and Dostoevsky invoked by other authors.31 Thus Sartre
cites Dostoevsky rather than Nietzsche’s Gay Science, and rather than his recollection of the “invincible order of Assassins” and their signature motto: “Nothing is
true, everything is permitted”32 to point to the inescapability of freedom that is
GS §125; Z Prologue.
GS §125.
29
Eisler, Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler, 1906 [1901]),
733. Eisler, an Austrian philosopher who wrote in 1902 one of the first monographs on Nietzsche’s
theory of knowledge, makes the distinction between epistemological and theoretical knowledge
and dates the former back to the sophist and skeptic traditions of antiquity. Eisler discusses the
relevance of Jacobi’s invocation of the term nihilism as well as Paul Mongré’s exposition of Nietzsche’s cosmology or ontology of limitless chaos. The mathematician, Felix Hausdorff, used the
pseudonym of Paul Mongré in his writings on Nietzsche.
30
Karl Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Frankfurt am Main: Pieper, 1994). For a
contextual reading including Jaspers, see Jin-Woo Lee, Politische Philosophie des Nihilismus. Nietzsches Neubestimmung des Verhältnisses von Politik und Metaphysik (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992).
31
Wolfgang Müller-Lauter offers an overview of the context of Nietzsche’s use of the term
nihilism beyond Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons to Alexander Herzen and Peter Kropotkin, noting
further Charles Andler’s suggestion that Nietzsche’s use of the term may have been inspired by
Paul Bourget’s Essais de psychologie contemporaine inasmuch as Bourget himself engages the writings of the Russian anarchist tradition. See Müller-Lauter, “Nietzsche’s Will to Nothingness,”
Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of his Philosophy, trans. David J.
Parent (Bloomington: University of Illinois Press, 1999 [1971]), 41–9. Löwith adds Karl Gutzkow to the mix but most critically, Löwith emphasizes the influence of Hermann Rauschning’s
The Revolution of Nihilism: Warning to the West, trans. E. W. Dickes (New York: Alliance Book
Corp, 1939 [1938]).
32
GM III: 24.
27
28
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key to existentialism: For Sartre, “Dostoevsky once wrote ‘if God did not exist,
everything would be permitted’; and that, for existentialism, is the starting point.
Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence
forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside
himself. He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse.”33
The specifically literary constellation of the origins of the term nihilism
underscores the circumstances Nietzsche himself emphasizes in his own reflections on “European Nihilism,”34 drawing a particular connection between the
ideologies and histrionics of journalistic anarchism and the politically rational
appeal of natural science.
Heidegger himself has been condemned for his own contributions to both
epistemic and political nihilism. Yet Heidegger distinguishes his reading of the
incipient danger of nihilism from Nietzsche’s own interpretive trajectory, as
Heidegger links Nietzsche (where most interpretations contrast Nietzsche) with
the tradition of Western metaphysics and thereby with nihilism.35 It makes all
the difference here that Heidegger thematizes nothingness in his own Being
and Time, especially in his Introduction to Metaphysics, well before he explicitly
turns to Nietzsche.36 As Heidegger reflects, “The root meaning of the Latin
word nihil, which even the Romans pondered (ne-hilum), has not been clarified
to the present day.”37 Thus Reiner Schürmann has cause to invoke Heidegger’s
characterization of the “nihilism” of the modern, technological worldview as
obscuring Heidegger’s more foundational or preliminary question concerning
what can appear to be the nihilism of thinking the no-thing of Being.
It is thus plain that speaking of nihilism we have to do with an inherently
equivocal term. As Heidegger began his own academic career as a scholastic
logician, he is thus careful to remind us that thinking the logical meaning of the
nothing, “nihilism is an illusion.” But for Heidegger, the tacitly thetic dynamic
of the logicizing perspective is itself part of the problem:
33
Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007
[1946]), 28–9.
34
The published text of the second volume of Heidegger’s Nietzsche expands Heidegger’s
reference to Nietzsche’s Will to Power by quoting Otto Pöggeler’s citation from Jacobi’s Brief an
Fichte. In English, see Heidegger, Nietzsche. Volume IV: Nihilism, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (San
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1982), 3.
35
For a reading sensitive to Heidegger’s distinctions, see Michel Haar, Par-delà le nihilisme.
Nouveaux essais sur Nietzsche (Paris: PUF, 1998); but also Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being
and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
36
“Why are there essents, rather than nothing?” Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959 [1953/1935]), 1.
Heidegger’s invocation of the nothing is relevant for Sartre’s Being and Nothingness as indeed for
Camus as well as Bataille, but also Blanchot and Klossowski.
37
Heidegger, Nietzsche, IV, 19.
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The question arises whether the innermost essence of nihilism and
the power of its dominion do not consist precisely in considering the
nothing merely as a nullity, considering nihilism as an apotheosis of
the merely vacuous, as a negation that can be set to rights at once by an
energetic affirmation.38

The logical alternative is a patent one: “the nothing either ‘is’ something thoroughly null or it must be a being. But because the nothing obviously can never
be a being, the only other alternative is that it is the purely null.”39
Heidegger was attacked for taking the question of the nothing as seriously
he did,40 and it is by way of a defense that we may read his reflection that “Perhaps the essence of nihilism consists in not taking the question of the nothing
seriously.”41 Genuine or authentic nihilism [eigentliche Nihilismus] is at work
for Heidegger in the very ontic preoccupations of modernity, as an absorption
with things in the oblivion of Being, treating “Being as a nothing (nihil).”42 To
the extent that Heidegger contends that “Metaphysics as metaphysics is nihilism
proper,”43 he also argues that “the metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic than
that of Nietzsche.”44
From Löwith and Lefebvre to Heidegger and Schürmann, the range of
readings that can be given of Nietzsche and nihilism seems limitless and nearly
all of these include political overtones on the extremes of both the left and
the right. In this way, Richard Wolin’s The Seduction of Unreason cannot but
seem to overlap with Abir Taha’s Nietzsche, Prophet of Nazism.45 In the spirit
of Georg Lukács’ politically violent indictment already patent in his title From
Ibid., 21–2.
Ibid.
40
Heidegger’s “nothing” provoked the logical ire of no one less than Rudolf Carnap, and
the subsequent debate continues to be central to the stylistically adumbrated (but still politically substantive) analytic-continental divide. I thus discuss this latter context in Babich, “On
the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche’s Lying Truth, Heidegger’s Speaking
Language, and Philosophy,” A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy, ed.
C. G. Prado (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2003), 63–103. See also James Luchte, “Martin
Heidegger and Rudolf Carnap: Radical Phenomenology, Logical Positivism and the Roots of the
Continental/Analytic Divide,” Philosophy Today 51–3 (2007): 241–60.
41
Heidegger, Nietzsche, IV, 21
42
Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 217.
43
Ibid., 205.
44
Ibid. See for a discussion, William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to
Thought (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1963), 363ff.
45
See Richard Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006); and Abir Taha’s Nietzsche, Prophet of Nazism:
The Cult of the Superman—Unveiling the Nazi Secret Doctrine (Bloomington, Ind.: AuthorHouse,
2005).
38
39
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Nietzsche to Hitler,46 and like Hermann Rauschning’s more generally political
warning in 1938 against the nihilism inherent in National Socialism,47 readings of this kind track a causal connection between Nietzsche’s thought and
political nihilism. Even as critical an author as Jürgen Habermas highlights
this same causal danger in an epistemological context as he underscores our
now supposedly secure “immunity” to Nietzsche’s all-too “contagious”48 brand
of nihilism.
Other authors writing on Nietzsche and nihilism mix theological and political accounts, as some have read theological nihilism back into the beginning
of the Judeao-Christian tradition with Augustine.49 In addition to other studies,
Gianni Vattimo’s more contemporary reading of nihilism and postmodernity50
is significant to the same extent that the postmodern (the word and the idea)
galvanizes (and irritates) readers of a recent generation rather in the way that the
terminology and conception of nihilism affected earlier generations. It would take
us in another direction than the current reading follows, but it is also relevant
See Georg Lukács, Von Nietzsche bis Hitler oder Der Irrationalismus in der deutschen Politik
(Frankfurt: Fischer, 1966); and Lukács, The Destruction of Reason: Irrationalism from Schelling to
Nietzsche, trans. Peter Palmer (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981). See, for an
insightful analysis, Endre Kiss, “Lukács versus Nietzsche, or The Most Significant Stalinist Trial
Against Philosophy,” East Europe Reads Nietzsche, ed. Alice Freifeld, Peter Bergmann, and Bernice
Glatzer Rosenthal (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 207–18.
47
Rauschning, who took his doctorate with Heidegger as Löwith did, warns of the inherently
nihilistic dangers of National Socialism in Paris with his Die Revolution des Nihilismus. Kulisse und
Wirklichkeit im Dritten Reich (Zürich: Europa Verlag, 1938). See too Rauschning, Masken und
Metamorphosen des Nihilismus: der Nihilismus des XX. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt and Main: Humboldt,
1960). For his part, Habermas repeats Lukács’ influence, as I argue in Babich, “Habermas, Nietzsche, and the Future of Critique: Irrationality, The Will to Power, and War,” Nietzsche, Habermas,
and Critical Theory, ed. Babich (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2004), 13–46.
48
See Habermas, “On Nietzsche’s Theory of Knowledge: Postscript from Nietzsche’s Erkenntnistheoretische Schriften,” Nietzsche, Habermas, and Critical Theory, ed. Babich (Amherst, N.Y.:
Humanity Books, 2004), 47–67, at 47. Scholars who write on Habermas and Nietzsche duly
repeat Habermas’s emphasis upon this same issue of contagion.
49
Many philosophical themes have been traced, in one way or another, to Augustine. And
nihilism is no exception. Or if not Augustine, then at least Peter Lombard, as it turns out to be
hard in the case of Augustine to read between mentions of nothing and nihilism. See note 29
above as well as, for further discussion, Seizo Sekine, Transcendance and Symbols in the Old Testament: A Genealogy of the Hermeneutical Experiences (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999). Sekine does this
in associative concord with Asian thought.
50
Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture,
trans. John R. Snyder (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988). The language of the postmodern continues
to irritate some readers even as it fades from popular use. See for a discussion, Babich, “Nietzsche
and the Condition of Post-Modern Thought: Post-Nietzschean Post-Modernism,” Nietzsche as
Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra, ed. Clayton Koelb (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1990), 249–66.
46
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to note discussions of Nietzsche and Buddhism51 in addition to treatments of
Nietzsche and literary nothingness.52
To cite Nietzsche’s most famous non-book The Will to Power: “What is
the meaning of nihilism? That the highest values devalue themselves.”53 Where
the waters become troubled, both philosophically and politically, is with the
still ongoing implications of Löwith’s contention that Nietzsche’s philosophical
influence brought political nihilism “into existence.”54 Along with the political
nihilism associated with Nietzsche are the high stakes associated with talk of the
death of God: two world wars, that is to say Nazism in particular and fascism in
general. And beyond the fulminations of the arguments for or against Nietzsche
as putative “Godfather” of fascism, the same conviction continues.
In the sections to follow, I explore philosophical nihilism in the context of
“tragic knowledge,”55 along with political readings of nihilism in order to raise
the all too patently practical question of what we might call, to give it a name,
“planetary nihilism”—including the ongoing and hence affectively nugatory
threat of nuclear annihilation, but also the literal and everyday annihilation
of plant and animal life, indeed of organic and inorganic nature by bits and
pieces: not everything, not all at once, just some things, until there is nothing
left to destroy.

II.
Nietzsche and Philosophical Nihilism: Tragic Knowledge. Starting with the
first section of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche underscores the dangers of the
Kantian distinction between the apparent and the real, the phenomenal and
noumenal world. For Nietzsche, it is as philosophers of what he will later call
In addition to others who have written on this theme, see Robert G. Morrison, Nietzsche
and Buddhism: A Study in Nihilism and Ironic Affinities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
as well as Benjamin A. Elman, “Nietzsche and Buddhism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 44.4
(1983): 671–86; and Freny Mistry’s earlier Nietzsche and Buddhism: Prolegomenon to a Future
Study (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981).
52
Such readings are various, including Blanchot, Camus, Klossowski, and of course Bataille
in addition to Alphonso Lingis and, from a different perspective, Gillian Rose. See further the
contributions to Evil Spirits: Nihilism and the Fate of Modernity, ed. Gary Banham and Charlie
Blake (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).
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KSA 12, 9 [35], 350. Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht, §2. Note the section title “Nihilismus”
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For a discussion of the relevance of this particular emphasis on “value,” see Babich, “Heidegger’s
Relation to Nietzsche’s Thinking: On Connivance, Nihilism, and Value,” New Nietzsche Studies
3.1/2 (Fall/Winter 1999): 23–52.
54
Löwith, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, “Foreword to the
Second Edition,” 7.
55
BT §15; GS §370.
51

Nietzsche on Science, Anarchy, and Democratic Nihilism

241

the “dangerous perhaps” that Kant and other critical thinkers “sense that under
the reality in which we live and exist, there lies hidden a second and completely
different reality, and that this surface reality is therefore an appearance.”56 The
rub comes in knowing this “second” reality, an impossibility on Kant’s critical
terms, adduced as such solely to bridge the gap or Humean connection between
cause and effect, otherwise known as the gap between empirical and logical necessity. Thus in “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Nietzsche speaks of “the gigantic
horror which overcomes the human being who has lost his footing amidst the
cognitive forms of the phenomenal world as the principle of reason in any of
its forms threatens to collapse.”57
For Nietzsche, the rectifying justification [Rechtfertigung] of art lies in its
power to redeem or harmonize this dangerously dissonant insight, providing
an ultimately “metaphysical comfort,”58 as Nietzsche characterizes the comfort
of art in terms of both critical as well as romantic idealism.59 This is Nietzsche’s
argument for the genesis of the tragic work of art as a necessary response to the
sight of the chaotic heart of Being, that is, the ancient Greek’s insight into “what
is” as a glance “into the terrible annihilation of supposed world history together
with the cruelty of nature.”60 It is in this critical spirit that Nietzsche affirms “We
have art in order that we are not undone by the truth.”61
Two meanings of nihilism are at play in Nietzsche’s writings from the outset:
the nothing of the yawning abyss at the bottom of things as sheer appearance and
the nauseating effects of the insight into this abyss leading either to the tragic
lethargy of absurdity or the deadly consequences of the “buddhistic” abnegation
of the will. Nietzsche’s reading of the “birth” of tragedy is thus founded upon
the nihilistic consequences of Kantian epistemology. Hence Nietzsche explains
that “the real truth of nature and the lie of culture that poses as if [als ob] it were
the only reality is similar to that between the eternal core of things, the thingin-itself and the whole world of phenomena [Erscheinungswelt].”62
In 1792, Jacob Hermann Obereit invokes the term “nihilism” that we above
spoke of as Nietzsche’s intellectually unhinging, “gigantic horror,” in order to
give a name to the fatal logical, emotional, and above all spiritual consequence
of setting the noumenal (that is, for us, an x; i.e., for us: nothing) in the place
BT §1.
Ibid.
58
BT §8.
59
This is what Nietzsche means by an “artist’s aesthetics.” For further references to the literature on this theme and for discussion, see Babich, “Nietzsche’s ‘Artists’ Metaphysics’ and Fink’s
Ontological ‘World-Play,’” International Studies in Philosophy 37–3 (2005): 163–80.
60
BT §7.
61
KSA 13, 16 [40], 498.
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of God.63 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi makes this point more plainly and still
more importantly for history just because he makes it in a letter to Fichte.64
Philosophical nihilism is the epistemological legacy of Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason as it was regarded after Jacobi and as can be seen, and as Michael Gillespie
emphasizes, in Jean Paul,65 the aphorist so important for Nietzsche, no less than
for Schopenhauer. It is in this same epistemological spirit that Nietzsche frames
his initial reflection on the “science of aesthetics”66 in The Birth of Tragedy in
terms of “tragic knowledge.”67
To this extent, Nietzsche’s later claim in his “Attempt at a Self-Critique”
that his early efforts in The Birth of Tragedy were concerned with nothing other
than “the question of science” is more than a mere figure of speech as many of
Nietzsche’s readers, especially the more analytically-minded among them, have
supposed. Beyond science, and as Schiller had similarly sought to do with respect
to the aesthetic as such, Nietzsche points to the transfiguring role of art inasmuch
as art alone, and precisely as illusion, works to harmonize the nihilistic paralysis
of “tragic knowledge.” The question Nietzsche is later at pains to specify as the
“problem of science”68 in The Birth of Tragedy articulates the “tragic insight” that
follows from the darkness of the recognition of seeing “how logic turns upon
itself at these boundaries and finally bites its own tail.”69 It is in the spirit of this
63
Obereit, “Widerruf für Kant: Ein psychologischer Kreislauf.” Gnothi seauton oder Magzin
zur Erfahrunsseelenkunde als ein Lesebuch für Gelehrte und Ungelehrte IX–2 (1792): 109–26. See
Jacob Hermann Obereit’s critique of the consequences of Kantian idealism, Der wiederkommende
Lebensgeist der verzweifelten Metaphysik. Ein krit. Drama zu neuer Grund (Berlin, 1787). For a
thorough overview, see Dieter Arendt’s book Nihilismus. Die Anfänge von Jacobi bis Nietzsche
(Cologne: Jakob Hegner, 1970) in addition to the more commonly cited essay by Otto Pöggeler,
“Hegel und der Anfänge der Nihilismus-Diskussion,” Man and World 33 (1970): 163–99. See
further, Stephen Wagner Cho, “Before Nietzsche: Nihilism as a Critique of German Idealism,”
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 18.1 (1995): 205–32. On the issue of the Wirkungsgeschichte
of the influence of German idealism on the conceptual role of nihilism, see too Löwith’s 1939
exposition of Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet in Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, 301–2.
64
See Jacobi, The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1994), esp. 519. See for a discussion, Frank Ankersmit, “Jacobi: Realist, Romanticist,
and Beacon for Our Time,” Common Knowledge 14.2 (2008): 221–43. See more broadly, Roland
Duhamel, Die Decke auf dem Kopf: Versuch einer Deutung des Nihilismus (Würzburg: Königshausen
und Neumann, 2006) who notes that the first usage of the term can be traced to F. L. Goetzius
in 1733 (58).
65
Thus Michael Gillespie begins with Jean Paul in “Fichte and the Dark Night of the
Noumenal I,” the third chapter of his Nihilism Before Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996).
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tragic insight that Nietzsche also explains the Apolline illusion of Greek tragedy
as “radiant patches, as it were, to heal a gaze seared by gruesome night.”70
Nietzsche devotes his life to drawing out the epistemological and moral
consequences of this very specifically philosophical nihilism. And beginning
with the philistinism of the humanistic theologian, David Strauss, and reflecting
further on the cultural uses and harm of “history” for life, Nietzsche’s Untimely
Meditations continues in “Schopenhauer as Educator” to invoke Heinrich von
Kleist as the poetic exemplar of a cultivated human being confronted with the
philosophical insight leading to the nihilism Jacobi outlined in his own letter to
Fichte, comparing this encounter as being brought to the brink of “nothing . . .
but nothingness.”71 This nihilistic prospect led Jacobi and others to urge the path
of a calculatedly mortal “leap of faith” (salto mortale),72 leading Schopenhauer
to “despair of truth.”73
Despair, as a word for philosophical nihilism, is usually associated with
depression, spiritual or otherwise. As Nietzsche sees it, the “danger” of philosophical nihilism is the inevitable companion of “every thinker whose starting
point is Kantian philosophy, provided that in his sufferings and his desires he is
a strong and complete human being and not merely a clattering machine that
cogitates and calculates.”74 The philosophical problem of nihilism, as Nietzsche
cites Kleist’s account of this nihilistic insight, is that “We cannot decide whether
what we call truth is really truth, or whether it only appears to be such. If the latter
is the case, then the truth we collect here is nothing upon our death, and all our
efforts to procure a possession that will follow us to the grave are in vain.”75
How is one to bear the nihilistic insight of tragic knowledge? Nietzsche does
not argue against the furthest and most difficult consequences of this nihilism
and he refuses to forget that however one ambitions to take the “leap” of faith,
the vault itself is inevitably fatal just because the issue is inherently a matter of
life and death, with the consequence that for Nietzsche the religious remedy as
a leap, like its antecedent in Pascal’s wager, remains as fundamentally nihilistic
(or anti-life as Nietzsche emphasizes) as the problem it is meant to solve.76 It
70
Ibid., §9. This dark reflection is tied to Nietzsche’s articulation of the healing balm of the
tragic artwork, which he continues to explore on the model of the uncanny and strange Greek
hero of ultimate reflexivity as Goethe mentions Lyncaeus, who had the disturbing ability to turn
his own eyes inward. Cf. BT §15 and §24.
71
Jacobi, The Main Philosophical Writings, 519.
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Ankersmit discusses Jacobi’s “salto mortale from reason into belief and feeling” in Jacobi,
The Main Philosophical Writings, 242.
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SE §3.
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Ibid.
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Ibid. (emphasis added). From Kleist’s letter to Wilhelmine von Zenge, 22 March 1801.
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Ankersmit notes Jacobi faced the same criticism from his contemporaries. Jacobi, The
Main Philosophical Writings, 242.
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will take a noble and rare philosophic sensitivity, as Nietzsche argues, in order to
grasp the implications of tragic critical knowledge, requiring all the resources of
culture and of cultivation—that Nietzsche and Löwith (and Burckhardt) named
“education”—in order to be able to endure this insight.
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche had argued on behalf of Schiller’s remedy
of aesthetic cultivation. In his Untimely Meditations he muses that Schopenhauer
might serve as educator not for everyone (for Nietzsche the only democracy to
be found highlights difference rather than equality) but much rather and only
for those “few” with an affinity for rarified thought coupled with a poetic—
and “knightly”—sensibility. Thus Nietzsche calls us to attend to the personal
life-circumstances that make all the difference for the aesthetic sensibilities
of Schopenhauer who had counseled a kind of ataraxia or resignation, as this
spirit of resignation is different in Pyrrho77 (and hence the critical importance
for Nietzsche of noting the difference between personalities).
If the mischief is in trying for such a renunciation of the will, there is an
even greater danger in its universalization. One can aim for the peace and the
calm of detachment and serenity (positive nihilism) and wind up in the swirls
and misery of pessimistic ressentiment (negative nihilism). Thus Nietzsche sought
affirmation which is always, as yes-saying, not only the oldest word for consummation but also a word for love, Nietzsche’s amor fati.
Such an experimental philosophy as I live anticipates experimentally even
the possibilities of a fundamental nihilism; but this does not mean that
it halts at a negation, a No, a will to the No. Rather, it wants to get
through to the reverse—to a Dionysian Yes-Saying to the world as it is,
without subtraction, exception, or selection—it wants the eternal cycle:
the same things, the same logic and illogic of entanglements. The highest
state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship to
existence—my formula for this is amor fati.78

III.
Planetary Nihilism or Nihilism and Science. If nihilism means that the
highest values devalue themselves, if nihilism corresponds to the negative pronouncement “God is dead,” Nietzsche also argues that an objective and soberly
demystified and scientific perspective is part of the same nihilism. Hence science,
See Löwith, Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same for a discussion of
Nietzsche and Pyrrho in connection with nihilism. Although John Marmysz, Laughing at Nothing: Humor As a Response to Nihilism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996) titles his book with the image
of Pyrrhonic laughter, he omits any reference to Löwith in this context.
78
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understood as the contemporary manifestation of the ascetic ideal, corresponds
to planetary nihilism. Heidegger emphasizes the nihilism of modern technology
as Schürmann reminds us in terms of the more current context of globalization. As Schürmann analyzes this point, “contemporary man, ‘dislodged from
his essence, compensates his homelessness by the organized global conquest of
the earth.’ As decidedly one-dimensional, such conquest is the most revelatory
manifestation of the technological phuein.”79
Yet if the meaning of nihilism cannot but catch us in a fundamental
equivocation, the meaning of the ascetic ideal is no less equivocal and political
commentators can remind us that Nietzsche is all for the ascetic ideal as a means
of self-creation. Indeed, it is only by dint of the ascetic ideal that the human
animal ever became interesting in the first place.80 And it is by means of the
ascetic ideal that artists and creators become what artists they are.
Nietzsche concludes his On the Genealogy of Morals with the still ill-understood contention that the ascetic ideal is not opposed by but and much rather
extended into the technical and natural scientific modern ideal. This scientific
reference should be heard not merely in connection with what we noted above
as the anxious heart of philosophical nihilism,81 but more plainly or literally.
Modern science does not give us the power to create ex nihilo however this consummately or divinely nihilistic ideal may inspire our longing. What science does
do is to provide us the power to generate nothingness just a bit, just where there
had once been something (anything/everything). It is thus with reference to the
technological twilight of modern science that Nietzsche’s madman’s question
acquires and maintains its uncanny relevance: “How could we drink up the sea?
Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon?”82
This is the explosive light play of the fire cracker which had been one of the
first uses for what became the gunpowder used in muskets and cannons, and subsequently in rocket launches and, metaphorically rather than materially, thence to
all the modern devices for “shock and awe,” all the way up to nuclear weapons. For
over half a century, an almost infinite interval by modern standards of impatience,
we have been perfecting this awful power. As a result, the very idea of the bomb
now underwhelms us where it once preoccupied thinkers and scientists from Jaspers
and Jonas not to mention Heidegger and Arendt to both Heisenberg and Einstein;
79
Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 191. Schürmann cites Heidegger’s Question
Concerning Technology in his text.
80
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and one can argue that nihilism today corresponds to the political itch or inching
toward atomic war, as George Lakoff has drawn our attention to even the language
we use as it articulates our desire to keep nuclear “options” “on the table.”83
Part of the equivocal meaning of nihilism is that more than reflecting a
negative animus vis-à-vis the world—that would be one meaning of nihilism
as a psychological desire to negate or wish away the world (in this sense, simply
closing one’s eyes is a kind of nihilism)—the scientific and technological practitioners of today’s ascetic ideal are well beyond merely affective “world denial.”
Thus the Husserl of the Crisis points all too literally to the incipient threat of
destruction.84 For Lefebvre, with “its wars and revolutions, defeats and victories,
confrontation and turbulence, the modern world corresponds precisely to Nietzsche’s tragic vision. . . . This is a new negativity, a tragic negativity which manifests
itself as incessant violence.”85 Thus we might take Deleuze and Guattari at their
word and thus we might draw the spatial perspective of a Lefebvre to its fullest
consequences (a spatiality that should be crossed with Schürmann’s economic
account of Heideggerian space/time),86 just to practice one of Nietzsche’s favorite
expressions in the service of an effectively phenomenological perspectivalism.87
It is salutary in this connection that what was shocking for the Heidegger
of the Beiträge or indeed for Arendt in The Human Condition, becomes merely
banal for Jean Baudrillard (not to begin to speak here of Slavoj Žižek). The capacity for world destruction does not stop at the earth. Old news, we say. But
can we learn from the reminiscences of a Sputnik enthusiast of the cold war or
the convictions of the more recent fascism that continues even after the current
election and its new hopes?
83
For a reflection on the indirect language associated with the politics of (and policies concerning) nuclear war, see George Lakoff, for a Rockridge Institute post, variously re-posted on
the web: “The Words None Dare Say: Nuclear War,” http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/research/
lakoff/the-words-none-dare-say-nuclear-war.html. Accessed 16 January 2009.
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Gianni Vattimo notes Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences in this context. See Vattimo, Dialogue with Nietzsche, trans. William McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press,
2006), 130–1.
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Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 23.
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Schürmann discusses space in a Heideggerian context understood in an economic sense
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Retrospectively, we know, J. Robert Oppenheimer reports the words “I am
become death” as he heard them in his mind upon the detonation of the first
atomic bomb. Heideggerian, Jasperian, Arendtian worlds away from our modern, technological, scientific world, what occupied Krishna and Arjuna was the
human-referred aspect of an all-too-human sized war, and it is that same scale
that should still engage the whole of our concern today. Oppenheimer articulates
the nihilism of modernity, the twentieth-century concern with the absolute and
totalizing mobilization of power and of doom on the grand scale.88 This is the
cosmic scale of Nietzsche’s world-child, building up and casting down worlds
in play. But that is myth and today’s war-games are not about play on the level
of the cosmos, but all-too human rapacity that is beyond our wildest powers of
imagining but already in play, already developed, business as usual, that is power
and the pursuit of profit on this earth, here and now.
It is unclear that there can be anything like redemption or salvation from
this all-too-human cupidity and rapacity that we insist upon everywhere we
go, wherever we are. Hence Nietzsche, who noted that living and murdering
are identical, is able to define humankind as a “planetary infection,” as Deleuze
emphasizes this phrase, hence the “humanism” Heidegger is at pains to underline
as foundationally, ineliminably nihilistic.
For my part here, just to keep my cards on the table, I am more interested
in the way we human beings express our insidious growing role as a “‘skin disease’
of the earth”89 in pesticides, poisons, clear-cutting, the building of ordinary roads
to ordinary ends, building ordinary homes for the sake of ordinary business,
developing natural resources, “exploring” traditional and alternate sources of
energy. That is, I am concerned with development per se and beyond the oxymoronic phantasm of “sustainability.”90 The devastation of the population of
88
See Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962);
and for a discussion of Kahn from a present day context, Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of
Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2005). See too for a discussion, Karl Löwith’s “European Nihilism: Reflections on the Intellectual
and Historical Background of the European War,” in Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European
Nihilism, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 173–284; as well as
Karl Jaspers, The Atom Bomb and the Future of Man, trans. E. B. Ashton (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1961).
89
Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Thomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 64. Deleuze quotes Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II Of
Great Events.
90
See the final chapter of Babich, Words in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music
and Eros (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006); and see for a more public (and
applied) policy reading including a useful discussion of the north-south politics of the newly
globalized world, Aidan Davison, Technology and the Contested Meaning of Sustainability (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2001).
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raptors, hawks, and eagles, by the slicing arms of the windmills we build in our
search for some other, which is to say additional, way to power the things we
have made corresponds for me to the darkest of the world-darkening meanings
of nihilism. From our cars to the entirety of our electric grid: driving our devices
for fitting ourselves with an integrated world of our own making (this is the
hype in Baudrillard’s “hyper-reality”) and thereby girding ourselves, guarding,
saving ourselves from the incursions of what we call an “outside” world into “our”
world, ranging from (ontically) nihilistic “devices” (or doomsday machines) to
computers to the highways and city lights that themselves devastate animals
from elk, squirrels, and foxes to birds, insects, amphibians, all the animals one
ever/never learned about, and the slow death of plant life, ah, and especially the
trees, from the streetcars and the trains as well as all the other kinds of energy
we desire to warm us in the dark of the coming night. Thus we take no thought
for the prairie dogs and wolves and Canada Geese we kill and for convenience’s
sake—that, once again, is what we name wildlife “control”—we call for the
wholesale slaughter of untold beings, individual beings. Yet another meaning,
if anyone is still counting, of nihilism.
The worlds annihilated, the worlds destroyed are not intended to be our
own “world.” Although and peripherally we can, at best, work ourselves up to a
worry about the accidental incidental consequences of our intentions. For the
point here, however, is germane to the question of nihilism that untold worlds
not our own have already been destroyed. Hence our more or less thoughtless
sense of impotence and inevitability in the face of modern technology. This
sense of impotence reflects the contemporary face of nihilism much more than
the idea of the death of God or the loss of the old social order threatened by
socialism—the last always a danger posed more by an idea, an ideal less realized
but hinted at by its always incomplete practice. For as Nietzsche reminded us,
modern science not only “proves” that everything and everyone is equal before
the law,91 but modern science also makes it plain, and this was key for both
Heidegger’s and Löwith’s notion of European nihilism, that everything, that
anything is possible.

IV.
The Politics of Reading Nietzsche’s Nihilism. Nietzsche’s patently, presumably
anti-democratic sentiments have not hindered scholars from developing the
theme of Nietzsche and a perfectly popular or else more “agonistic” democracy.92
BGE §22.
Lawrence Hatab, A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy: An Experiment in Postmodern Politics
(Chicago: Open Court. 1995); see also as his “Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can
Still Be Nietzscheans,” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002): 132–47. See too William E.
91
92
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But the association of democracy and natural science, although exactly characteristic of Nietzsche’s thought, characterizes few readings of Nietzsche and even
fewer reading of Nietzsche and nihilism.
Indeed Nietzsche’s anti-god bit of fuming on behalf of enlightened modern
science (taking enlightened modern science as uncritically as possible), is often
supposed to be constitutive of nihilism as such: “the acknowledgment that traditional values are hollow.”93 But acknowledgment is as acknowledgment does, and
the challenge for theorists who read Nietzsche and the political is the challenge of
linking a reading of the political in Nietzsche’s writing to the political, to politics
per se.94 For most people in the modern era, one tends to be able to have one’s
hollow values—this is the point of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s claim that
“the highest values devalue themselves”—while nonetheless counting on them
as well. As a result, a specifically nihilistic recognition of this point “proceeds
subtly”—i.e., slowly, and thus we read that “Nietzsche tries to help [nihilism]
along by announcing the death of god.”95 For his part, Nietzsche traces the
death of god back to the ancient gods, not only great Pan, as Heidegger quotes
Nietzsche as saying, but also to more recondite eastern divinities associated
with Buddhism96 as well as, of course, the Norse gods destined for death and
decomposition after a final battle that has drawn the greater part of literary (and
musical) attention. Rather more mainstream, in the Christian teaching of the
death of God in the person of Jesus Christ, everyone knows the all-too-human
death of God, which the Church, at least, officially commemorates two days out
of every year and indeed with every celebration of the mass. All this and more is
at the heart of Nietzsche’s proclamation of the “death of god.”97 It is critical to
Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1991); and for an overview, Christa Davis Acampora, “Demos Agonistes Redux:
Reflections on the Streit of Political Agonism,” Nietzsche-Studien 32 (2003): 373–89.
93
Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 45. See also Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1991), but also his “The Politics of Nietzsche’s Philosophy: Nihilism, Culture and Power,”
Political Studies 33(1985): 418–38; as well as Tracy Strong, “Language and Nihilism: Nietzsche’s
Critique of Epistemology,” Theory and Society 3 (1976): 239–63 (also in Friedrich Nietzsche and
the Politics of Transfiguration [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975 (1987; 2000)]), 55ff.,
and, by way of a kind of negative political theory, again, Gillespie’s Nihilism Before Nietzsche.
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this notice that we do not hearken much to the report of this death in modern
times and hence this once-upon a time “highest” of values can, according to
Nietzsche, be said to have been “devalued.”
Explaining his own an-archic political account, Reiner Schürmann writes
that
Nietzsche’s program of transvaluation subverts all representations of
a first, be it man, God, a principle for reasoning or acting, or an ideal
such as scientific truth. Nietzsche is assuredly entitled to the various
epithets of Anti-Christ, Anti-Socrates, Immoralist (or rather Amoralist). Strictly speaking, however, these are titles of incipient closure.
They express, not some doctrine on the subject of Christ, Socrates,
or morality but the foundering of any epochal principle at the end of
modernity. They are titles for the transmutation of the origin understood as primum captum into the origin as unseizable aggregation and
disgregation of forces.98

Where for Schürmann, Nietzsche is a postmodern thinker, dissolving or pluralizing into a name for almost anything—as Nietzsche once said of himself
“I am all the names in history”—and serving Heidegger as another name for
technology,99 other scholars argue that Nietzsche is thoroughly modern while
he is less than modern for a great range of others readers, including those who
convict him of a very obvious nostalgia for antiquity.100
Unmodern or postmodern, Nietzsche explores the cultic tradition of
tragic transfiguration in his first book together with (and this is what makes it
hard to read that first book) the overcoming of that tragic condition by way
of reason and science, with reference to a creative force he there names the
“insatiable.” This “insatiable,” which corresponds to what Nietzsche calls an
and Dionysian Faith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); as well as Eugen Biser,
“Gott ist tot”: Nietzsches Destruktion des christlichen Bewußtseins (Munich: Kösel, 1962); and Paul
Valadier’s several books on Nietzsche, such as his Nietzsche et la critique du chrisitianisme (Paris:
Cerf, 1974), among others.
98
Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, 54–5.
99
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“artist’s metaphysics”101 as differentiated from a metaphysics of either religious
or mechanistic kinds, he later names the will to power.102 For Nietzsche here,
this insatiable phenomenon always finds myriad ways “to detain its creatures
in life and compel them to live on.”103 This manifold creative power includes a
number of illusions but in every case as Nietzsche emphasizes, these illusions
are meant to function on the cognitive level as a fetter—from Kant to Schiller
and Schopenhauer: “One is chained by the Socratic love of knowledge and the
delusion of being able thereby to heal the eternal wound of existence; another
is snared by art’s seductive veil of beauty fluttering before his eyes; still another
by the metaphysical comfort that beneath the whirl of phenomena, eternal life
flows on indestructibly.”104
The creative nihilism of the artist turns this seductive captivation to its
advantage in the service of life and thus one can argue that for the human
animal, nihilism may be another way to hang on to life. Knowledge and action
exclude one another.

V.
Universal Law, the Democratic Ethos, and Annihilation. Reflecting as he did
on the history of scholarship in general and science in particular, Nietzsche argues
that a scientific system stands or falls with the merits of its advocate and its times
just because what we take to be the “scientific” arrangement in question is not
its scientific rigor (or lack thereof ) but an explicitly interpretive reflection of the
temper of the times, inclusive of the personalities of its proponents (researchers,
theorists, scholars, scientists). I have argued that Nietzsche’s philosophic insight
took this historical reflection on the basis of his own science of classical philology
to science in general, especially chemistry as he favored this metaphor but also
including logic and physics, as well as the biological sciences including physiology (which Nietzsche incorrectly imagined would be developed to a highly
particularized/individualized as opposed to standardized, one body-function,
one-genome fits-all kind of science) and medicine as well.
Beyond personal tastes and affections, Nietzsche sets the nineteenth century
ideal of science and scientificity in the same conceptual world as the political
and economical ethos of socialism in its own historically anarchic context, challenging the physicist’s lack of hermeneutics or what he here explicitly names:
101
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“bad ‘philology’” exemplified by an uncouth insistence upon the “laws” of nature
and the smiling equivocation that takes natural law as analogous to specifically
European law and thus as inherently universal and still more as equalizing. For
Nietzsche this inclination always and inevitably—and this is the heart of what we
may call Nietzsche’s hermeneutically sensitive phenomenology of science—was
not merely casually equivocal but dangerously ‘illogical’ in a scientific context
just because, as he argues, “nothing is really equal.”105
For Nietzsche, the desire for “freedom of the will” contradicts the entirety
of physical and metaphysical causality at once: this is “the desire to bear the
entire and ultimate responsibility for one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God,
the world, ancestors, chance, and society”106 from any role in one’s ultimate
individuality. Every man his own Jesus now becomes; every man is the center
not merely of his own world but of the cosmos.107 Although it is easy to take Nietzsche as arguing on behalf of natural causality (one’s evolutionary endowment,
physiology, upbringing), it is this very naturalistic argument Nietzsche refuses.
Ensconced in a routinely misread passage that also happens to be the locus
classicus of Nietzsche’s most patent—let me emphasize this—because self-identified self-contradictory assertion (expressly conceding that the claim that truth
as interpretation is itself no more than an interpretation), Nietzsche claims that
modern science articulates the conceptual world of anarchic socialism seeking “to
meet the democratic instincts of the modern soul!”108 Thereby Nietzsche is able
to tease out the workings of an insidiously anti-aristocratic “mental reservation”
within science in the process: “Everywhere equality before the law—nature is in
this matter no different from us and no better off than we.”109
If Nietzsche sets off what we can now see to be his hermeneutics of science
by thus challenging the very idea of the causa sui in the sections leading up to
this section in Beyond Good and Evil, questioning as we noted at the start both
religion and the enlightenment together with the traditional conception of free
(or, and indeed, unfree) will,110 here he challenges the weaknesses of the physical
scientist’s formation (or scholarship) on the scientist’s own terms as a lack of
interpretative facility and “bad ‘philology.’”111 This incompetence is exemplified
by the equivocal language of the “laws” of nature.
Nietzsche argues for the thought-possibility of an anarchic horizon not in
his own political nineteenth century sense, but in a sense closer to Schürmann’s
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an-archy, a scientific scenario reflecting “the ‘necessary’ and ‘calculable’ course”
of nature, “not because laws rule the world but because there is a total absence of
laws.”112 In the wake of this insight, reflecting the mature Nietzsche’s expression
of philosophical nihilism, “much remains” as Schürmann has it, “for us to think,
but little for us to know.”113 That is, as Schürmann glosses Nietzsche here: “To
‘know’ is to create the fictions that we hold objective and true.”114
As Gillian Rose has argued, it is the idea of law as such (and our “preoccupation” with law) that unites the self-destructive impulses of the ascetic ideal.115 To say
that one would rather will nothing is thus not at all to say that one would rather not
will at all. And here we recall Schürmann’s clarification of contemporary nihilism,
according to which, and Carnap was already well-advanced to this insight, Heidegger’s reflections on ‘no-thing’ are particularly meaningless, worth nothing, as we
say. In this respect, Schürmann can conclude, the contemporary era is essentially
“nihilistic” just to the degree that “it proclaims aloud that only entities and goods
are worth anything, that their ‘difference’ from being or the Good is worth nothing. Here nihil stands for the soberness of the technological economy according to
which there is nothing to look for behind the visible and the invisible.”116
Willing nothing, as current world events arguably have made all too plain, is
about willing things and goods and our own all-too-humanist purposes and ends
and all at any price. In this way, such a humanist nihilism is both consummately
democratic and perfectly rational. It is not irrelevant here that this same nihilistic
will is crumbling as we speak, a catastrophe on the economic order of real or
market values that we can neither identify or acknowledge much less explain,
which is only to say that it is a catastrophe we cannot halt and cannot change.
Thus we slaughter whales (and everything else we call meat), we “collectively” club
seals to death, and our tax dollars continue to pay for the aerial chasing down
of wolves, to shoot them at the end of the sport (for both our Park Rangers and
for bounty- and other hunters), after running them to exhaustion. Nor do we
oppose any of this, nor do we act, instead we sign a pretend internet campaign
to appeal for the value of change and watch television specials, although many
of us no longer even bother to do that.
If we find ourselves unable to move to any real or effective change in what
we, collectively as human beings, do, that is to say: if we find ourselves unable to
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halt the decimation of the planet, the rape of the seas, the systematic exclusion of
wildlife—and how “wild”? from what perspective?—from every secret corner of
the earth, “developed” for our purposes, we are indeed consummately resolved,
committed, Nietzsche argued, to willing nothingness. And the nothingness we
intend has nothing to do with our own nihilation, our own annihilation. As I
noted to begin with, we do not will the destruction of our own lives, only the
lives of other beings, not ourselves: our enemies we need not call by name, as
the ultimate supplement, the infinitely replaceable, the substitutable.117
We will instead and for no passion other than utility, the annihilation, the
destruction of beings who are nothing to us, we concede or legislate, tolerate
the destruction of every kind of animal or plant but also and ultimately the very
earth itself, which we plunder for materials we name “raw” and thereby claim,
as so many “natural resources,”—who made them ours?—to be mined for profit
and energy, spilling, as we do, poison onto the surface of the earth to bleed into
rivers and ground water, when we do not drill into the sea, leaking the oil that
is also a nihilism as oil kills everything it touches, and of course, this is what oil
does, it touches everywhere we drill.
Contemporary nihilism, so some argue, has limits just because we draw
the line at ourselves, or more precisely said, at beings of our own kind. But
here too what John Gray, in an indictment striking both for its passion and the
relative mildness of its claims, called our intrinsically humane “rapacity” is unmistakable.118 This is greed more than thoughtlessness, and this greed obliterates
life in its wake: our manner of fishing not by the fist-full but football-field-full
drag nets, from boats that churn the depths of the seas into packaged frozen
meals, spewing blood behind them as they go for months in deep water, or the
mechanical coldness and heartlessness of factory farming, mechanically inseminating, mechanically feeding and watering, and then slaughtering animals as
mechanically119 as possible.
In all Nietzsche tells us, we are engaged in nothing less, and that is to say at
no lesser scale, than wiping away the horizon itself. The Nietzsche who calls to us
to be true to the earth utters this at once anti-humanist and anti-nihilist imperative
This may be part of the reason we like to read Carl Schmitt.
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just because it is needful. Our nihilism is directed against the earth itself: the
space of being for those other “folk” who also and along with human beings have
inhabited the earth until now, those whom, as the historian Lynn White reminds
us, a once-upon-a-time subversive mendicant friar called brother and sister,120 so
naming fishes, birds, all manner of crawling animals, including the insects we
cannot imagine considering, lizards and frogs, sharks and whales, elephants and
sea turtles. We kill all of these, the very least to the greatest of our brethren.
We should find the thought of exploring extra-terrestrial Lebensraum (this
is the point of “bombing the moon,” of exploring Mars) a sobering one, as if,
after we have done here, we might just move on, colonize space. What will be
left of the planet? Who will be left—and who are we that we think this way?
We are hell-bent on willing nothingness (annihilation) at our own hands,
and if Nietzsche is right, what Heidegger called for with respect to the modern
technological means of life is impossible, at least failing the dispensation beyond
ourselves that the later Heidegger argued that we would need. As Heidegger
noted, reading Nietzsche, there is no remedy for or against the horror vaccui of
the human will that might simply be met with the counsel of releasement, that
might merely or modestly recommend that some of us, you or I, might just and
simply stop or let be.
It is in this sense that one might think of the alternative between nihilism
and an an-archic politics as Schürmann speaks of it: “If the principles are to
yield, and entry into the event is to occur, unprincipled praxis will either claim
everyone that lives in the economy of transition or it will be nothing at all.”121
I am inclined to close by repeating Nietzsche’s word that we would rather
will the nothing, das Nichts, than not will at all. Thoughtless and unprincipled,
far from Schürmann’s ‘nothing at all,’ we will not leave off willing until there is
nothing left to will.122
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